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The Efficiency of Bargaining under Divided
Entitlements
Ilya Segalt & Michael D. Whinstontt

INTRODUCTION

Ever since Professor Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed published their seminal article Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,' the question of how to best define property rights has been a central
question in the legal literature.2 Calabresi and Melamed highlighted the fact that, if bargaining is impossible, a liability rule
(in which an individual can take another's entitlement by paying
damages) can make the allocation of the entitlement depend on
the taker's privately-known valuation. 3 Thus, they argued, while
simple property rights are preferable when bargaining is possible, liability rules can serve a market-mimicking role in cases in
which it is not. 4 Indeed, by setting damages equal to the plaintiffs expected value for the entitlement, the defendant would be
induced to take precisely when his valuation was greater than
this expectation, thus enhancing efficiency over what could be
achieved with a simple property right held by the plaintiff. 5
t
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1
See generally Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 Harv L Rev 1089 (1972).
2
Calabresi and Melamed's work explored and expanded upon ideas presented by
Ronald Coase in his famous 1960 article. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1 (1960).
3
See Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1108-10 (cited in note 1).
4
See id at 1106. See also Ian Ayres and Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:Dividing a Legal Entitlement to FacilitateCoasean Trade, 104 Yale L J 1027, 1032 (1995).
5
See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An
Economic Analysis, 109 Harv L Rev 713, 773 (1996). The same issues arise in contract
law with the comparison of specific performance and damage remedies for breach of contract. For simplicity, throughout the Article we will refer only to property rules and liability rules, but the analysis applies more broadly.
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Subsequently, scholars beginning with Professors Ian Ayres
and Eric Talley and Professors Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell began to question the presumption that simple, undivided property rights are always best when bargaining is possible.6
Noting that when bargaining is perfect, the Coase Theorem indicates that all forms of entitlements achieve a first-best outcome,
they asked whether certain forms of entitlements such as liability rules might perform better than simple property rights when
bargaining is possible but inefficient due to asymmetric information. 7 As Kaplow and Shavell suggested, liability rules might
be expected to perform better because of their "head start," the
fact that they outperform property rules when bargaining is impossible. 8 Ayres and Talley argued that, moreover, liability rules
provide an "information-forcing" benefit by encouraging victims
to reveal their harm truthfully. 9 To date, however, the literature
has considered this question using very particular examples and
bargaining procedures.
In this Article, we address the "horse race" between property rules and liability rules by taking a mechanism-design approach.lo In particular, we ask what the best form of entitlements is given that bargaining always takes a form that is
"optimal" given the informational constraints that are present.
Through most of our analysis, we do so by focusing on a
benchmark measure of bargaining efficiency, the subsidy that
would be required for the parties to achieve an efficient outcome
6
See Ayres and Talley, 104 Yale L J at 1098-99 (cited in note 4); Kaplow and
Shavell, 109 Harv L Rev at 773 (cited in note 5). See also Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell, Do Liability Rules FacilitateBargaining?A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 Yale
L J 221, 233 (1995). For a more limited challenge to the notion that either damages or an
injunction is categorically better in situations in which bargaining is possible, see generally A. Mitchell Polinsky, ControllingExternalitiesand ProtectingEntitlements: Property
Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J Legal Stud 1 (1979). See also A.
Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and
DamageRemedies, 32 Stan L Rev 1075, 1103-06 (1980).
7 See generally Coase, 3 J L & Econ 1 (cited in note 2). See also Ian Ayres and Eric
Talley, Bargainingin the Shadow of Different Regimes, in Ian Ayres, OptionalLaw: The
Structure of Legal Entitlements 142, 145-52 (Chicago 2005).
8
Kaplow and Shavell, 105 Yale L J at 225 n 12 (cited in note 6).
9 Ayres and Talley, 104 Yale L J at 1100 (cited in note 4). But see Kaplow and
Shavell, 105 Yale L J at 221-22 (cited in note 6) (offering four primary grounds for critiquing Ayres and Talley's claim that liability rules are "information-forcing").
10 Ayres and Talley, 104 Yale L J at 1101 (cited in note 4) (describing a "Coasean
horse race" between property rules and liability rules). For another mechanism design
approach, see also Eric L. Talley, Property Rights, Liability Rules, and Coasean Bargaining under Incomplete Information *4 (Stanford Law School, John M. Olin Program in
Law and Economics Working Paper No 114, Aug 1994).
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given the informational constraints they face. Under most conditions of asymmetric information, bargaining will fall short of
achieving efficiency, regardless of the bargaining procedure parties follow.1" The dual pressures of what economists call "incentive-compatibility" (bargainers' inclination to understate or
overstate their true benefit or harm when bargaining) and "individual rationality" (the fact that an injurer or victim can always
refuse any proposed bargain and revert to his or her entitlement
under the law) prevent always reaching an efficient outcome.
Our benchmark measure is the subsidy that is needed to relax
the individual-rationality constraints to a sufficient degree to
permit efficiency if the best possible bargaining procedure were
to be followed.
As a general matter, liability rules with unrestricted choices
of damages must be weakly better than simple, undivided property rules-after all, a simple property rule can be viewed as a
special case of a liability rule in which damages are infinitely
large, or at least large enough to deter any taking. Thus, for
there to be a horse race between property rules and liability
rules, we must either be comparing general, unrestricted forms
of property rules (in other words, allowing for what Ayres and
Talley called "fractional property entitlements12) or be considering a restricted class of liability rules (for instance, liability
rules with damages equal to the expected harm). As noted by
both Ayres and Talley and Kaplow and Shavell, fractional property entitlements are sometimes physically possible-an asset
may be owned in partnership, or a firm may have the right to
pollute up to some specified limit-and can also be created by
legal uncertainty over who will be determined to be the proper
13
holder of the entitlement.
We begin in Part I by conducting the "unrestricted" horse
race in which fractional property entitlements are compared to
liability rules. We argue that, very generally, fractional property
entitlements will outperform liability rules. Indeed, well-chosen
fractional property entitlements can enable efficient bargaining,
4
while efficiency is typically impossible under a liability rule.'
11 See Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for
BilateralTrading, 29 J Econ Theory 265, 273 (1983).
12 Ayres and Talley, 104 Yale L J at 1072 (cited in note 4) (quotation marks omitted).
13 See id at 1080-82; Kaplow and Shavell, 105 Yale L J at 222 n 5 (cited in note 6).
14 This conclusion draws from prior works by the authors. See Ilya Segal and
Michael D. Whinston, Property Rights and the Efficiency of Bargaining*13-14 (Toulouse Network for Information Technology Working Paper, Aug 2012), online at
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We illustrate this very general result using an example that we
then carry through the rest of the Article.
We then turn to the "restricted" horse race, comparing undivided property entitlements to traditional liability rules with
damages equal to the expected harm. In Part II, we consider the
case of two-party disputes. We report a striking result for such
settings: the best (subsidy-minimizing)property right is the same
as when bargainingis impossible. This is true in several senses.
First, an undivided property entitlement should go to the individual with the greatest average value for it. Second, regardless
of who chooses under a liability rule, the optimal damage payment equals the expected harm-the average benefit or harm of
the other party-exactly as when bargaining is impossible.
Third, the party who should choose under a liability rule is the
party who should choose under a liability rule when bargaining
is impossible. Fourth, and finally, the best liability rule always requires a lower subsidy than the best undivided property entitlement.
In Part III, we extend our analysis to the case of situations
involving more than two parties. We show that, in general, the
correspondence between the best entitlement when bargaining
is impossible and the one that minimizes the subsidy required to
achieve efficient bargaining breaks down. We describe what determines the best entitlement in these settings and illustrate its
determination in our example.
Finally, while our subsidy formula provides one possible
benchmark for measuring the efficiency of entitlements when
imperfect bargaining is possible, in many-perhaps mostsettings, no such subsidy is available. If so, a more useful
benchmark may instead be the surplus that can be achieved, absent any subsidy, through the best possible bargaining procedure. Determining the best entitlements by this criterion is considerably harder. In Part IV we analyze an example that again
maintains one striking finding from our subsidy analysis: the
best liability rule again sets damages equal to the expected
harm.

http://www.tse-fr.eulimagesdocltnitlproperty rights-rargaining-aug2012-v2.pdf (visited Mar 2, 2014). See also Ilya Segal and Michael D. Whinston, A Simple Status Quo That
Ensures Participation(with Application to Efficient Bargaining),6 Theoretical Econ 109
(2011).
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I. THE UNRESTRICTED HORSE RACE
We first consider the "unrestricted" horse race and ask
which is better, the best fractional property entitlement or the
liability rule involving the best possible damage level.
In our previous work we showed that in a wide range of circumstances, efficient bargaining can be achieved if property
rights take the form of a fractional property entitlement in
which each individual's entitlement equals his average holding
in the efficient allocation.15 What it means for efficient bargaining to be achievable is that there is some bargaining process (in
economist's lingo, some "mechanism") whose outcome is always
efficient that is "incentive compatible" (so individuals always
choose the strategies that maximize their payoffs), "individually
rational" (so individuals are always willing to participate, regardless of their level of benefit or harm), and budget balanced
(so what one individual pays, the other receives).16 In our previous work, we showed that efficient bargaining can be achieved
if and only if a particular type of mechanism (known as a
"Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism" in the economics literature) does not require a subsidy to get individuals to partici17
pate rather than simply stick with their entitlement.
The reason a divided entitlement can help achieve efficiency
has been noted by Ayres and Talley: it makes the parties unsure
of whether they want to be a buyer or a seller and so helps limit
incentives for misrepresentations of benefits and harms while
bargaining.8 As it turns out, such divisions can be extremely effective in a wide range of circumstances.
As an example, suppose that Alpha Corporation can put up
to one ton of pollutants into a river that flows by Ms. Smith's
fishery and Alpha's benefit x from polluting is uniformly distributed between $0 and $100 per ton. Alpha's average benefit from
pollution is therefore $50. Smith's harm is also between $0 and
$100, however it averages more than $50. In particular, we assume that the probability (density) of harm y is aya-1/lOOa,

15 See generally Segal and Whinston, 6 Theoretical Econ 109 (cited in note 14).
16 This approach follows that of the seminal 1983 paper by Professors Myerson and
Satterthwaite. See generally Myerson and Satterthwaite, 29 J Econ Theory 265 (cited in
note 11). The first paper to investigate the effect of dividing entitlements in the Myerson
and Satterthwaite setting was Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, and Paul Klemperer,
Dissolving a PartnershipEfficiently, 55 Econometrica 615 (1987).
17 Segal and Whinston, 6 Theoretical Econ at 115, 118 (cited in note 14).
18 See Ayres and Talley, 104 Yale L J at 1087-88, 1102 (cited in note 4).
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where a = 3/2.19 Smith's average harm with this distribution is
$60.20 Figure 1 plots the two probability-density functions.
FIGURE 1. DENSITIES OF BENEFIT (DASHED) AND HARM (SOLID)
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The efficient outcome has one ton of pollution if Alpha's
benefit exceeds Smith's harm, and no pollution otherwise. It can
be shown that this involves pollution occurring 40 percent of the
time; the expected surplus, equal to the average of Alpha's benefit less Smith's harm when pollution occurs times the 0.4 probability of pollution occurring, is 11.4. So the result from our
previous work described above implies that if Alpha has the
right to pollute up to 0.4 tons, equal to Alpha's average level of
pollution in the efficient outcome, efficient bargaining between
Alpha and Ms. Smith is possible.21
What if instead a liability rule is used? In our previous work
we derived a simple formula for the subsidy that enables efficient bargaining when the following two conditions hold:
(1) It is possible that each individual may have a value for
the entitlement (a "type") that makes it efficient for that
individual to stick with his entitlement regardless of
other individuals' values. We call such a type an "opt-out
type."
19

Note that if instead we had a = 1, then Smith's harm would have been uniformly

distributed between $0 and $100.
20 All calculations are shown in the Appendix.
21 See Segal and Whinston, 6 Theoretical Econ at 123 (cited in note 14).
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(2) In the event that no deal is reached with an individual,
all other individuals' collective payoff is lowest (in expectation) when the individual's type is his opt-out type. In
that case, we say that this type is an "adverse opt-out
type."
As an illustration, suppose that Alpha must pay Smith $50
per ton in damages should it pollute. Then Alpha has an adverse
opt-out type, which is when it has a benefit of $100. In that case,
it will always pollute under the liability rule and pollution is efficient regardless of Smith's harm. Moreover, since the $50
damage is less than Smith's average harm of $60, Smith is
worse off when Alpha pollutes, so this type for Alpha is an adverse opt-out type.
Under this liability rule, Smith has an adverse opt-out type
as well: that type has a harm of $50, equal to the damage payment. To see why this is true, observe that when Smith's harm
is $50, under the liability rule Alpha's decision of whether to pollute is always efficient. Since Alpha's payoff is in fact unaffected
by Smith's value under the liability rule, this is an adverse opt-out
type for Smith.
For two-party disputes in which these conditions are met, so
that each individual i has an adverse opt-out type, the required
subsidy is:
V* - V - V2,1)
where V* is the efficient surplus and Vi is the expected payoff of
individual i when a bargain is not reached and individual -i has
its adverse opt-out type. 22 Intuitively, to induce efficiency, each
party can be given all of the social surplus and charged a participation fee. Before the fees are collected, this creates a gross inflow
to the parties equal to the efficient surplus, V*. At the same
time, each adverse opt-out type must be willing to participate,
and so each adverse opt-out type is willing to pay a participation
fee equal to the difference between V* and what the party would
earn by opting out. For each individual i, this difference can be
shown to equal the other party's payoff when the adverse opt-out
type opts out. So (1) represents the net subsidy required.23 We
22 See Segal and Whinston, PropertyRights at *13 (cited in note 14).
23 For further information supporting and explaining this idea, see generally Segal
and Whinston, Property Rights (cited in note 14).
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showed in our previous work that this required subsidy is positive in a very wide range of cases. 24
As an illustration, under the liability rule discussed above
for Alpha and Smith, this subsidy formula takes the following
form:

TABLE 1. REQUIRED SUBSIDY WITH LIABILITY RULE
Average Efficient Surplus
Less:
Alpha Average Liability-Rule Payoff
Smith Average Liability-Rule Payoff When Alpha
Has $100 Benefit
SUBSIDY =

11.4
12.5
-10
8.9

This can be understood as follows: The efficient allocation
has Alpha pollute when its benefit exceeds Smith's harm and results in an expected surplus of 11.4, as we noted above. Under
the liability rule, in the event that no agreement is reached, Alpha chooses to pollute when its value exceeds $50. This happens
with probability 0.5, and when it happens Alpha's value is on
average $75. Subtracting the $50 damage Alpha pays, it earns
on average $25 in these cases. Multiplying by the 0.5 probability, Alpha's average payoff is $12.5. (Note that Alpha's average
liability-rule payoff does not depend on Smith's harm.) Smith, on
the other hand, receives $50 under the liability rule when Alpha's value is $100, since Alpha then always chooses to pollute.
Her expected harm is $60, for a net loss of $10. The required
subsidy is therefore $8.9.
Thus, with this liability rule, a positive subsidy is required
to achieve efficiency. In fact, as we will see in the next Part, regardless of the damage payment and whether it is Alpha or
Smith who chooses whether to exercise the pollution option, a liability rule cannot achieve efficiency here, so there is always a divided fractional property entitlement that is better than any liability rule. Indeed, the same is true for any setting in which the

24 More precisely, it is positive whenever the outcome in the event bargaining
breaks down is inefficient. See id at *14.
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identity of the efficient possessor of the entitlement is uncertain,
25
including cases with more than two agents.
II. UNDIVIDED PROPERTY RULES VERSUS TRADITIONAL LIABILITY
RULES WITH Two PARTIES

We next compare traditional liability rules (with damages
equal to the expected harm) with simple (undivided) property
rules using our subsidy measure. Consider, first, simple property rules, which assign full ownership to one party. Who should
be the owner, and what is the required subsidy to achieve efficient bargaining? As an illustration, should Alpha have the right
to pollute, or should Smith have the right to a pollution-free environment?
Suppose, first, that Smith possesses the right to a pollutionfree environment. Observe that with an undivided property entitlement an individual's payoff Vi when bargaining fails does not
depend on the other party's benefit or harm-the payoff is simply
the individual's expected benefit or harm at the default outcome.
So, in this case, the required subsidy is:
TABLE 2. REQUIRED SUBSIDY WITH SMITH'S UNDIVIDED
PROPERTY RIGHT

Average Efficient Surplus
Less:
Alpha Average Payoff from No Pollution
Smith Average Payoff from No Pollution
SUBSIDY =

11.4
0
0
11.4

If, instead, Alpha has the right to pollute, the required subsidy is:

25 A modified liability rule, however, in which there is a negligence standard, must
be at least as good as a divided property entitlement, since a divided property entitlement is a special case of the liability rule with a negligence standard in which the damage payment is infinite for any additional pollution.

The University of Chicago Law Review
TABLE

[81:273

3. REQUIRED SUBSIDY WITH ALPHA'S UNDIVIDED
PROPERTY RIGHT

Average Efficient Surplus
Less:
Alpha Average Payoff from Pollution
Smith Average Payoff from Pollution
SUBSIDY=

11.4
50
-60
21.4

So it is better for Smith, rather than Alpha, to possess an
undivided property right.
More generally, with traditional undivided entitlements,
formula (1) still applies but each Vi simply equals party i's average value for the entitlement (that is, with traditional undivided
entitlements, party i's value from his entitlement does not depend on the other party's benefit or harm). So the best assignment of the entitlement will maximize V1 + V2 , which amounts
to choosing the entitlements that maximize the surplus at the
default outcome. The way to do this is simply to give the undivided entitlement to the party with the larger average valuation
for it. Thus, we see that we want to assign the entitlement exactly as if bargaining were impossible!
We now look at liability rules. We will next show that traditional liability rules are best; that is, the damage payment that
minimizes the required subsidy is in fact equal to the expected
harm-again, exactly as in the case without bargaining. Since
any simple, undivided property rule is equivalent to a liability
rule with an extreme damage (either zero or infinite) that either
allows or prevents all takings, this fact will imply that traditional
liability rules are better than simple property rules. (Although, as
noted above, traditional liability rules will not achieve efficiency.)
To see that the optimal damage equals the expected harm,
suppose the damage payment is D _<60. In this case, as before,
Alpha's adverse opt-out type has a benefit of $100. Using formula (1), the required subsidy is then:
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TABLE 4. REQUIRED SUBSIDY WHEN ALPHA CHOOSES WITH A
LIABILITY RULE HAVING D __60

Average Efficient Surplus
Less:
Alpha Average Liability-Rule Payoff26
Smith Average Liability-Rule Payoff
When Alpha's Benefit Is $100
SUBSIDY=

11.4
(l°-D)

2

(D - 60)
71.4-

(100-D)
200

2

D

This required subsidy is decreasing in D for all D _ 60 and
is strictly positive for all such D.27 If, instead, D > 60, Smith is
worse off when Alpha chooses not to pollute, since the damage
payment exceeds Smith's $60 average harm. As a result, Alpha's
adverse opt-out type now has a benefit of $0. The required subsidy is then:
TABLE 5. REQUIRED SUBSIDY WHEN ALPHA CHOOSES WITH A

LIABILITY RULE HAVING D

60

Average Efficient Surplus
Less:
Alpha Average Liability-Rule Payoff
Smith Average Liability-Rule Payoff When
Alpha's Benefit Is $0
SUBSIDY =

11.4
(i°-D)
200

2

0
11.4-

(100-D)

2

200

which is increasing in D for D > 60 and is again strictly positive
for all such D.28 Thus, the lowest required subsidy occurs when
D = 60, which equals Smith's expected harm!29
Since the two possible (undivided) property rules correspond
to D equaling $0 and D equaling $100 (thereby leading Alpha to
either always pollute or never pollute if bargaining breaks
26 Regardless of Smith's harm, Alpha exercises its option to pollute with probability
(100 - D)/100 and, when it does so, its average gain is (100 - D)/2. So VApha equals
2
(100 - D) /200.
L < 0.
27 The derivative of the required subsidy with respect to D is -- 100
L > 0.
28 The derivative of the required subsidy with respect to D is 1 - 100
29 Professor Yeon-Koo Che also derives this result. See Yeon-Koo Che, Beyond the Coasian
Irrelevance: Asymmetric Information IV (2006), online at http://www.columbia.edu/-yc2271
/files/publications/Asymmetric%2OIniformation.pdf (visited Mar 2, 2014).
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down), this already tells us that a traditional liability rule (with
damages equal to the expected harm) is better than any simple
property rule.
Finally, we now ask whether it is in fact Alpha, or might
instead be Smith, who is the best chooser under a liability rule.
In particular, what if Smith instead has the right to buy clean
water in return for a payment D, with Alpha able to pollute otherwise? Now the payment that minimizes the required subsidy
will be $50, Alpha's expected benefit. To see this, suppose that
D _<50. Then Smith's adverse opt-out type has a $100 harm
from pollution (in which case Smith will choose to pay Alpha D,
which is less than Alpha's $50 average benefit from polluting),
while Alpha's adverse opt-out type has value D. The required
subsidy is:
TABLE 6. REQUIRED SUBSIDY WHEN SMITH CHOOSES WITH A

LIABILITY RULE HAVING D __50
Average Efficient Surplus
Less:
Alpha Average Liability-Rule Payoff
When Smith's Harm Is $100
Smith Average Liability-Rule Payoff
SUBSIDY =

11.4
D
0.4D L.)
11.4 - 40 (-)

-5/2]

5/2

so the required subsidy is decreasing in D. When D > 50, Alpha's
adverse opt-out type still has value D, while Smith's adverse
opt-out type switches to having a $0 harm from pollution (so
Smith never buys clean water if bargaining breaks down). The
required subsidy is:
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TABLE 7. REQUIRED SUBSIDY WHEN SMITH CHOOSES WITH A
LIABILITY RULE HAVING D _ 50

11.4

Average Efficient Surplus
Less:
Alpha Average LiabilityRule Payoff When Smith's
Harm Is $0
Smith Average Liability-

50
04D

Rule Payoff When Alpha's

5/2]

-

Benefit Is $D

[( __3 /2 ]
11.4 - 50 - 0.4D

SUBSIDY =

,0)

5/2]

This required subsidy is increasing in D. So D = 50, equal to
Alpha's average benefit from polluting, is best.
Looking at the subsidy formulas above, and substituting the
damage levels equal to the expected harms, we see that Alpha
should be the chooser since that scenario involves a lower subsidy:
11.4 - 50 - 0.4(50)[(o) 3 /2 - 5/2] > 11.4
1Y0

-

(100-60)2

(2)

200

In fact, this comparison is exactly the same as the comparison when bargaining is impossible. To see this, observe that
when bargaining is impossible and Alpha chooses facing a $60
damage payment, the social surplus is simply equal to Alpha's
expected payoff (since Smith is always exactly compensated for
her expected harm):
(100

-

60)2

200
On the other hand, when Smith chooses whether to buy
clean water facing a $50 payment, social surplus is:
50 + 0.4(50) 1(0),3/2

-5/2

where the first term is Alpha's payoff (it always gets a $50 expected
benefit, whether from polluting or the payment), and the second
term is Smith's average payoff. So inequality (2) is equivalent to
selecting the chooser who maximizes surplus in the absence of
bargaining.

Finally, note that the required subsidy when Alpha is the
chooser is positive; no liability rule can achieve efficiency here.
In summary, the subsidy-minimizing liability rule is exactly the
same traditional liability rule as when bargaining is impossible,
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and is better than any undivided property rule (and any other
liability rule with damages not equal to the expected harm).
One can also use this type of analysis to consider other types
of entitlements. Ayres, for example, discusses "dual-chooser
rules," in which one party is the default holder of the entitlement, but the entitlement can be exchanged for some fixed
amount D if both individuals consent.3 0 (The idea is that the
defendant might take, but the plaintiff has a choice of getting either a damage payment D or having the entitlement returned.)31
For example, suppose that Smith holds the initial entitlement,
and the damage payment D is again $50. Once again, both Alpha and Smith have adverse opt-out types. For Alpha it is the
type with benefit $0, and for Smith it is the type with harm
$100. (These are both the types that never trade in either the efficient outcome or the default dual-chooser outcome.) Now the
required subsidy is:
TABLE 8. REQUIRED SUBSIDY WITH DUAL-CHOOSER RULE

Average Efficient Surplus
Less:

11.4

Alpha Average Dual Chooser Payoff When Smith
Has Harm $100

0

Smith Average Dual Chooser Payoff When Alpha
Has Benefit $0
SUBSIDY=

0
11.4

Recalling our earlier discussion of undivided property
rules,32 we see that this dual-chooser subsidy is exactly the same
as when Smith has a simple right to no pollution. In fact, this is
a fully general result: the subsidy required with a dual-chooser
rule is always identical (for any damage payment D) to the subsidy required for the simple property rule in which the default
entitlement holder in the dual-chooser rule is assigned an undivided right.

Ayres, Optional Law at 54 (cited in note 7).
Admittedly, this may not be feasible with pollution, since once polluted the river
might not be (costlessly) returned to its original state as assumed here. It is a more natural possibility with other sorts of takings, or nuisance externalities.
32 See Tables 2-3 and accompanying text.
30

31
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III. OPTIMAL ENTITLEMENTS WITH MORE THAN Two AGENTS

We now consider the case in which there are more than two
agents. For example, imagine that Mr. Jones also owns a fishery
downstream from Alpha and has a harm z from pollution between
$0 and $100, which is drawn with probability b(z/lO0) 1- b,
where b = 2/3. Jones's average harm is then $40. Assume also
that Alpha now has a benefit from polluting that is uniformly
distributed between $0 and $200.
In the case in which there may be more than two agents, the
previous formula for the required subsidy generalizes to:
(N - 1)V* -

V-i,

(3)

where N is the number of individuals and V i is the average payoff of all parties other than i in the event that individual i has a
benefit or harm equal to that of its adverse opt-out type and
chooses not to participate in bargaining. Since the efficient surplus V* is not affected by the choice of entitlements, minimizing
the required subsidy amounts to maximizing Zi V-i.
Let's investigate the best liability rule in our pollution example, when Alpha is the chooser. Let Ds and D1 represent the
damage payments due to Smith and Jones, respectively, should
Alpha pollute. We will consider values for each of these damages
between $0 and $100.
To proceed, we need to say what happens when one of the
parties refuses to bargain. We will assume, perhaps optimistically, that the remaining parties end up reaching an agreement
that maximizes their joint payoff. Given this assumption,
Smith's adverse opt-out type has a harm equal to DS: with this
level of harm, Alpha and Jones will decide that Alpha should
pollute if and only if Alpha's benefit exceeds Jones's harm plus
Ds, so if Smith's harm is actually Ds this outcome is always efficient. In a parallel fashion, Jones's adverse opt-out type has a
harm D1 . Also, as in our discussion of the two-party case, Alpha's
adverse opt-out type is $200 if Ds + D1 < 100 and is $100 if Ds +
D1 >_100, where $100 is the average total harm for the two victims.
The calculation of the relevant coalition values is somewhat involved. We show in the Appendix, however, that any
subsidy-minimizing choice of damages has Ds + D1 = 100. Thus,
the total damages should equal the average total harm, exactly
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as when bargaining is not possible. However, while only the total
damage matters for efficiency when bargaining is impossible,
when imperfect bargaining is possible the required subsidy can
be affected by the division of damages among the victims. In the
Appendix we show that setting damages for each victim equal to
his or her expected harm is not optimal in this example-in fact,
all damages should go to Jones.
IV. UNDIVIDED PROPERTY RULES VERSUS TRADITIONAL
LIABILITY RULES WITH Two PARTIES: SECOND-BEST COMPARISON

As noted in the Introduction, an alternative benchmark for
comparing entitlements is the maximal potential expected surplus that can be achieved in the absence of a subsidy. Comparing entitlements using this criterion is, however, considerably
harder than using the subsidy criterion we have discussed earlier. We have examined this criterion for one special case of the
single-victim Alpha/Smith example above, in which Smith's
harm is uniformly distributed between $0 and $100 (corresponding to a = 1). Figure 2 shows the deadweight (efficiency) loss
from various levels of D (measured in units of 100). Two facts
are striking: First, the best liability rule sets D = $50; that is, it
has damages equal to the expected harm. Second, for D very
close to $0 or $100, the liability rule is worse than the simple
property right it is close to. Note that, absent bargaining, any
such liability rule would necessarily be better than the nearby
property rule. 33 This must mean that a liability rule with these
damage levels is detrimental to bargaining efficiency, in contrast
to the arguments of Ayres and Talley. 34

33 For example, absent bargaining, the derivative of expected surplus with respect
to D when Alpha chooses facing a damage of D is -(D - E[y]), where as before y is Alpha's harm, which is strictly positive for D below the average level of Smith's harm and
strictly negative for D above it.
34 See Ayres and Talley, 104 Yale L J at 1099 (cited in note 4).
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FIGURE 2. DEADWEIGHT LOSS AS A FUNCTION OF THE DAMAGE
PAYMENT D
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